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Yugoslav Diplomacy and the Greek Coup d’État of 1967
Abstract: Intensive conversations with members of political parties, closely reading the press, 
talks with other foreign diplomats, analytical evaluations of many individual events and 
their contextualization in the wider picture of the situation in Greece allowed Yugoslav 
diplomats to accurately assess the situation in the country, identify the potential of the mil-
itary junta and the centers of putschist support in Greece and abroad, follow their show-
down with left-wing and democratic options, recognize the ambitions of the putschist re-
gime and the nature of their dictatorship, have insight into the situation of the opposition, 
make out te contours of a possible state-political system, monitor relations with neighbor-
ing countries, closely follow the regime’s position to the Macedonian minority, follow the 
moves of the monarch, assess the permanence of compromises, observe the pressure of the 
international public and the controversial behavior of the Great Powers, and offer progno-
ses of the course of events in the near future. Yugoslav diplomats collected some of the rel-
evant information on the situation in Greece in other capitals (London, Ankara, Nicosia, 
Paris…). This information contributed to a wider evaluation of the existing circumstances 
and a sharper picture of the developments in Greece. The general opinion was that the 
Yugoslav diplomats were much better informed and more agile than their counterparts 
from other Eastern European counties, who were seen as “slow”, “unsure”, ‘“onfused”, “con-
tradictory” and so on. In the days and months following the coup, the Yugoslav diplomatic 
mission in Athens was a center where many came to be informed, consult with their peers, 
verify their assessments and hear Belgrade’s views. Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
collected information was sent to Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Koča Popović, Mijalko 
Todorović, Marko Nikezić, Ivan Gošnjak, Petar Stambolić and Ivan Mišković.
Keywords: Yugoslavia, Greece, Diplomacy, Coup d’Etat, 1967, Josip Broz Tito, Edvard 
Kardelj, Koča Popović
In mid-January 1968 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade was informed that the unstable political situation in Greece was “impeding” and “limiting” 
the activities of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens, but that the em-
bassy was nonetheless working well. The removal of the provision imposed by 
the Greek right-wing faction that the Yugoslav diplomats were to cooperate with 
only one Greek political party – the Center Union (Enosis Kentrou, EK) led 
by Georgios Papandreou – was seen as a valuable result achieved in the previ-








cooperation” with all Greek political actors and had particularly improved its 
contacts with the United Democratic Left (Eniéa Dimokratikí Aristerá, EDA), 
which included the communists. Other contributing factors to this overall posi-
tive assessment were the beginning of cooperation with local-level authorities, 
established contacts with social and academic organizations, strenghtening eco-
nomic ties, communication with the key actors in the political, social and public 
life of Greece, “opening” a dialogue on the relevant questions of Greco-Yugoslav 
relations in the present and and future. As highlighted in the report of the Yu-
goslav diplomatic mission in Athens, all of this was achieved in a rather difficult 
and “constrained” working environment characterized by the instability of Greek 
governments and the “abnormal and unstable” internal situation in which “right-
wing political forces had a decisive influence on the country’s policies”.1 In view 
of this situation, the diplomatic mission in Athens was judged to be working 
well; the information forwarded to Belgrade was accurate and the assessments 
of Yugoslav diplomats correct and reliable; there was apparent continuity in the 
following and assessing of the political situation and the general environment 
in Greece; the harvested information bore direct evidence that the representa-
tives of the embassy “knew people”, “had friends” and were making “professional 
contacts”.2 
The moment when these assessments of the activities of the diplomatic 
mission in Athens were made coincided with the systemic crisis that shook the 
Greek state and society. The crisis was deep, both political and state-level; it was 
also confounded by the collapse of the government of Stefanos Stefanopoulos 
formed in December 1966.3 1967 was to bring parliamentary elections and the 
provisional government that was to call and organize these elections was facing a 
plethora of domestic and international problems that needed to be solved. 
In this situation the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens was instruct-
ed to carefully follow the processes and activities which were seen as potentially 
having far-reaching importance both at the level of internal policy and the inter-
national level. Another important task was evaluating the activities of political 
leaders. The most interesting among them was certainly Andreas Papandreou, 
1  Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva Spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije [Diplomatic Archives 
(DA) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (MSP RS)], Politički arhiv 
[Political Archive (PA)], file 40, dossier 3, no. 42890, Proceedings from the extended staff 
meeting of the Embassy held on 11–13 January 1967, Athens, 7 February 1967. Ambassador 
Javorski and his associates M. Gabričević, B. Komatina, D. Vujanović, T. Vilović, N. Grubišić, 
Lj. Vujović, S. Nastić and M. Stepanović took part in the analysis of the situation in Greece.
2  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings from the extended staff 
meeting of the Embassy held on 11–13 January 1967 [hereafter: Proceedings], Athens, 7 
February 1967, pp. 4–5.
3  The Stefanopoulos government fell on 22 December 1966.
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the young leader of the liberal wing of the Center Union (EK), who was seen as 
a person of “strong political ambition and views that did not fit into the classic 
Greek type of parlor-and-party politics”. Based on his public appearances, he 
was seen as trying to “bring his political image out of his father’s shadow”, but 
also “not to harm” the interests of the Center Union. Yugoslav diplomats in Ath-
ens and the headquarters in Belgrade saw Andreas Papandreou as a “man with 
a future in politics” and a proponent of the general modernization of Greece, 
of leaving “the suzerainty of NATO” and of pursuing an “independent national 
policy”. In the opinion of Yugoslav diplomats, the political views of Andreas Pa-
pandreou had “revolutionary significance” and were considered a key factor in 
the bilateral relations of the two countries and the situation in the Balkans in 
the future.4
Besides Andreas Papandreou and his political supporters (around 40 
MPs), another  important task was following all forms of “potential differen-
tiation” in the Center Union (EK), especially because reshufflings and shifts in 
political positions were to be expected, along with “new political alliances and 
coalitions” with former political opponents. In this context, close attention was 
also paid to the liberal group led by Georgios Mavros, the politicians gathered 
around To Vima daily, and left-wing politicians who refused to join Papandreou.5
Analyses of Yugoslav diplomats claimed that the social and political prog-
ress of Western Europe, particularly France, was increasingly encouraging the 
formulation of independent national politices in accordance with national in-
terests. According to their assessment, Greece was lagging behind in this pro-
cess. The Greek political life, which unfolded in the framework of “parlor-and-
politics struggles” was seen as an “anachronism”. It was noted that on important 
questions that the country was facing, such as communism and socialism, major 
political parties had identical views to those promoted by NATO. The progno-
sis was that “modern progress” would quickly engulf Greece, inevitably shaping 
different views on foreign policy and its internal situation. Predicting that the 
political emergence of Andreas Papandreou represented an early sign of new 
social trends, Yugoslav diplomats strove to use their long-term monitoring of 
his activities to gauge future socio-political processes, the potential development 
of the situation in the Balkans, and any changes that might occur in Greco-
Yugoslav relations.6
Another influential political figure of interest for Yugoslav diplomats was 
Konstantinos Karamanlis, the politician who was, despite having emigrated to 
Paris in 1963, “active and present” in the developments in Greece. His frequent 
meetings with Charles de Gaulle were well known and there were reports that 
4  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, cat. no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 4–5.
5  Ibid. pp. 14–15.
6  Ibid. p. 6.
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he had undergone a “serious political metamorphosis” toward Gaullism. It was 
evident that Karamanlis no longer propounded a far-right political line and 
extra-parliamentary and non-constitutional means of political struggle. These 
changes in his political views indicated that he had learned some lessons and 
“revised” his former policy. It was assessed that the course of events would even-
tually “impose the need” for his return home. In this case, it was assumed that 
Karmanlis would demand a revision of the Greek constitution; insist on a pre-
cise determination of the monarch’s powers; strive to transform the National 
Radical Union (Ethnikī́ Rizospastikī́ Énōsis, ERE) into a modern political 
party; eliminate the existing leadership; and pursue a much more independent 
policy in internal and foreign affairs.7 The unknown direction of Karamanlis’s 
policy in this situation meant that the Yugoslav diplomats needed to accurately 
identify all political forces rooting for his return. To preempt any surprises, the 
Yugoslav diplomatic representatives were asked to activate their old contacts and 
thoroughly assess earlier experiences in “relations with him and his circle”.8 
At the same time Yugoslav diplomats in Athens had to continually follow 
the activities of the National Radical Union (ERE), seen by Belgrade as a politi-
cal party that was there to stay for the foreseeable future, particularly because 
this party, created owing to the efforts of state actors, had not fallen apart or even 
lost much of its strength during the years spent in opposition and without its 
leader, who had been forced to leave the country. The National Radical Union 
had been the decisive factor during the government of  Stefanos Stefanopoulos 
as well as one of the actors in its downfall. According to Yugoslav diplomats, this 
party had begun to show some changes, primarily its “distancing” from far-right, 
extra-parliamentary and non-constitutional means of political struggle. Hence 
the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Athens were tasked with establishing 
contacts with the forces of change in this party.9 Following the activities of the 
National Radical Union (ERE), Yugoslav diplomats noted the high political po-
tential of its leader in the country (since 1963 and the departure of Karamanlis) 
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos. Kanellopoulos was seen as the most responsible for 
the fall of the previous government and as a person close to the Crown who was 
capable of finding a common ground even with his political opponents.10
The Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens was also interested in the United Democratic Left 
(EDA), a party made up of communists, and the political activities of its prominent members 
– Ilias Iliou, Leonidas Kyrkos, and Manolis Glezos. It was seen as a “serious progressive force” 
with a growing reputation and influence among the people and well-respected in the ranks 
of civic parties and groups in the Parliament. It was believed that the party’s prestige would 
7  Ibid. pp. 5–6.
8  Ibid. p. 15.
9  Ibid. p. 15.
10  Ibid. p. 5–6.
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increase over the following months and that the Yugoslav diplomats’ existing good contacts 
with its leadership needed to be improved and developed “as much as possible” and “as much 
as local circumstances allow”. The diplomats were also asked to continue collecting informa-
tion on intra-party relations, views of some political groups, the influence and tasks coming 
from abroad, and the political course of the Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistikó 
Kómma Elládas, KKE). At the same time it was noted that the interest of the representa-
tives of the United Democratic Left (EDA) for Yugoslavia was in a state of “evident positive 
growth” and that everything needed to be done to further advance its cooperation with the 
Socialist Alliance of Yugoslavia.11
As regards the Crown – which included the ruling dynasty as well as 
royalist forces at home and abroad – it was thought that the Yugoslav diplomacy 
did not need to change anything in the “currently implemented assessments and 
approach”. Of course, it was clear that the Crown played a very important role 
in the Greek domestic and foreign policy. And while some concessions to demo-
cratic forces were noted, there were no reliable indications to tell if this was only 
a “short-term policy” that would end in a new deterioration of relations or a 
more permanent political course. The general view of Yugoslav diplomats was 
that contacts with the Crown should be improved.12
***
Yugoslav diplomats in Athens were very cautious in their “prognoses” about the 
chances of particular political parties to win the majority of votes at the forth-
coming parliamentary elections. The existing pre-election situation meant that 
the diplomatic representatives needed to “establish contacts at all sides” and that 
the efforts of the diplomatic mission were to be “as wide as possible”, while focus-
ing on the political parties most likely to come to power.13 
When it came to the internal situation, Yugoslav diplomats believed that 
Greece was not experiencing only a deep crisis of government, but also a long-
term process of internal instability, a crisis of socio-economic structures, the 
presence of international strategic and political interests pressurizing all spheres 
of life. The position of the provisional government was seen as very delicate. 
Among the issues that could potentially trouble its members, the following were 
particularly underlined: “maintaining order” in the pre-electoral period; imple-
mentation of measures to secure economic and monetary stability; stimulating 
economic development; disbanding militarist organizations (National Guard 
Defence Battalions, TEA); intensification of the Cyprus problem; the successful 
11  Ibid. p. 16.
12  Ibid. p. 16.
13  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 42424; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, 
cat. no. 42890, Proceedings, p. 7; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 44962, Conver-
sation with A. Papandreou, coded telegram of 4 February 1967.
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resolution of the question of international economic aid and securing interna-
tional aid. The prognosis was that the conflicting parties would see the pro-
visional government’s activities solely through the prism of their own partisan 
interests and that there would not be enough goodwill and understanding for 
the forced moves taken by the government. These conclusions were the result of 
close monitoring of a large number of “political actors” (the Crown, government, 
parliament, bureaucracy, political parties, army, social elites…) and of an analyti-
cal assessment of the synergy of their influences. Conversations with important 
persons in political life were also an important element of these assessments.14
In early 1967 the dominant view in the diplomatic mission of Yugoslavia 
in Athens was that the “Greek bourgeoisie… puts a premium on the stabiliza-
tion of the internal political situation in the country”. It was assumed that there 
had been a secret pact between Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Georgios Papan-
dreou to topple the government of Stefanos Stefanopoulos.15 Their cooperation 
in the future (post-election), which was speculated about in the left-wing press, 
was seen as possible by the Yugoslav diplomats. At the same time they hypoth-
esized that this could have been one of the reasons behind the divisions in the 
Center Union and the political and conceptional conflict between Georgios Pa-
pandreou and his son Andreas, who proposed a more “independent” and “mod-
ern concept of capitalist Greece”. As for Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, the leader of 
the National Radical Union (ERE), the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens 
was convinced that his primary objective was to consolidate his position at the 
helm of the party and thereby minimize the political influence of Konstanti-
nos Karamanlis, gather the old bourgeoisie of a moderate-right persuasion and 
strengthen the party. Yugoslav diplomats speculated that the toppling of the gov-
ernment of Stefanos Stefanopoulos had been done with the consent - if not on 
the demand - of the Allies (US, United Kingdom…). The motivation for such 
a move was seen in fears of a potential rise of the left which could have profited 
from the general instability in the country as well as in the need of international 
capital to have a stable political situation, and the profit secured due to Greece’s 
economic lagging behind other Balkan countries.16
14  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, cat. no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 13–14; DA, MSP 
RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 42424, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski about his 
conversation with Pipinelis of 20 January 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 
4243, Coded telegram from Athens on the interior situation in Greece dated 20 January 
1967.
15  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 42424, Coded telegram from Athens about 
the conversation with Pipinelis of 20 January 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, 
no. 42423, The internal situation after the fall of the Stefanopoulos government, 20 January 
1967.
16  According to available data, Greece’s NNP was growing at a rate of 8%; its industrial 
production at a rate of 13% and its agriculture had a 3.5% growth per annum. Investments 
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Based on collected information, Yugoslav diplomats assumed that at the 
forthcoming elections none of the major parties would manage to win the ab-
solute majority of votes, and that the party that achieved the best result would 
be forced to form a post-election coalition and eventually call a new election. 
However, the Yugoslav diplomats were not able to tell who could be part of this 
hypothetical coalition. It was noted that the temporary cooperation between 
the National Radical Union (ERE) and Center Union (EK) had ceased and 
that each of these parties was taking its own positions in preparation for the 
electoral struggle. It was assumed that the Center Union, in which they took a 
particular interest, would run in the elections as a whole, but that the disagree-
ments between the conservatives (G. Papandreou), the liberals (Mavros and the 
group around the To Vima daily) and the center-left faction whose members saw 
themselves as the “interpretors” of the party pogram (A. Papandreou) would not 
be resolved. In addition, based on information provided by A. Papandreou, the 
general pre-election situation was seen as “optimistic” and “very favorable” for 
the Center Union. A. Papandreou’s own view that the Center Union was still 
“an old-fashioned party” limited its possible electoral success, although it was 
believed that a part of the younger generation would nonetheless vote for them. 
The conspiratory methods of the “junta”, used by the far right, threatened to de-
lay the elections and made left-wing politicians uneasy. However, A. Papandreou 
was certain of the electoral victory of the Center Union. Just a few days before 
the introduction of the dictatorship, A. Papandreou believed that the “path to 
the elections [had been] secured” and that it was “too late… for any extraordi-
nary measures”.17
The Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens had information that the 
National Radical Union (ERE) would also retain its unity and come together 
around Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, who would also attract the support of the 
right-wing faction led by Panagiotis Pipinelis. In party circles there was concern 
about the situation in the country, the possibility that the elections would be 
delayed and a “firm-hand” government formed. Another reason for dissatisfac-
tion was the activity of some Western embassies “whose advisors and secretar-
ies believe that they know enough about Greek political life to have the right 
to influence its course”. In a bid to avoid this denouement, in late March 1967 
had a 17% growth. Immigration was reduced by 25% compared to the previous year. Prices 
went up by 5% per annum. The country’s debt was larger than its foreign currency reserves. 
DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 10–11.
17  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, cat. no. 42890, Proceedings, p. 7; DA, MSP RS, 
PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 4243, Coded telegram from Athens on the interior situation in 
Greece dated 20 January 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 44962, Conversa-
tion with A. Papandreou, coded telegram of 4 February 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, 
doss. 15, no. 411539, Coded telegram sent by Ambassador Javorski about his conversation 
with A. Papandreou of 29 March 1967.
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the National Radical Union initiated the collapse of the existing government, 
intending to form its own cabinet and hold elections. According to Yugoslav 
diplomats, the formation of a government led by P. Kanellopoulos was the “last 
stage” in the plan of the political right and the Crown to bolster their position 
on the eve of the elections, use public funds for their pre-electoral propaganda, 
and employ the official apparatus (primarily the army and police forces) to exert 
pressure on the voters. This was interpreted by Yugoslav diplomats as a possible 
sign that after the elections, if they were won by left-wing parties, the King could 
refuse to cede power to the victorious side in the elections.18
As far as the United Democratic Left (EDA) was concerned, it was noted 
that it pursued an “independent” line that separated it from the Center Union 
and made its program recognizable to voters. The communist leaders were wor-
ried about the elections. The system of proportional representation did not 
work in their favor and they were afraid that some of their party’s supporters 
would, amidst intense uncertainty, choose to vote for the Center Union instead. 
Before the dictatorship was introduced, the party leadership had “unreservedly 
discarded” the possibility of such a development.19
The fact that the Yugoslav diplomats had registered some US activity but 
that the role of the US had not been “fully and thoroughly” known to them 
meant that this question was to be given special attention. The activities of the 
Soviet Union were monitored no less closely. The Cyprus question and the rela-
tions with the Turks were another important topic that the Yugoslav diplomats 
tried to assess in the general context of the relations between the Great Powers 
– their intentions to come to a “solution” and the evident efforts of Greek politi-
cal parties to clear themselves of any responsibility if the Greek side were forced 
to accept some concessions and abandon its maximalist objectives. The Cyprus 
18  Some of their information about the situation in the National Radical Union was pro-
vided to Yugoslav diplomats by Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, 
doss. 15, cat. no. 42424, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski about his conversation with 
Pipinelis of 20 January 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 4243, Coded tel-
egram by Ambassador Javorski on the interior situation in Greece dated 20 January 1967; 
DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 411538; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 
15, no. 411614, Coded telegtam by Ambassador Javorski from Athens, 31 March 1967; DA, 
MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, cat. no. 412111, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski 
on the formation of the Kanellopoulos government, 4 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, 
f. 40, doss. 15, no. 412141, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski from Athens on the talks 
with Kanellopoulos, 11 April 1967.
19  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 42424; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 
3, cat. no. 42890, Proceedings, p. 7; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 4243, Coded 
telegram by Ambassador Javorski on the interior situation in Greece dated 20 January 1967; 
DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414587, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski 
from Athens dated 21 April 1967.
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question grew increasingly important in the months leading up to the elections, 
since its resolution was directly reflected in the internal situation in Greece and 
also involved the country’s relationship with the West. Even the “tiniest piece of 
information” that the Yugoslav diplomats in Athens could learn about the pos-
sible transfer of NATO bases from France and the strengthening of this organi-
zation in Greece was of key importance for the security of the Yugoslav state.20
In view of the earlier attempts of the Crown to “test the waters for the 
introduction of dictatorship”, indications that a dictatorship would not be able 
to “maintain the status quo” and the internal and international responses to these 
attempts, it was assessed that the proponents of a “firm” course would “turn the 
page” and abandon this compromising policy (for their own “political or self-
serving reasons”). In addition, it was concluded that the dictatorship option was 
not realistic and that it represented an “unfathomable threat” not only to the 
Greek society but also to the forces that would potentially become its imple-
menters. This was used to explain the intention of the Crown and the US to 
wash their hands of any stunts the far right might decide to pull and try to 
find a solution for the systemic crisis at parliamentary elections, thereby at least 
partially salvaging their jeopardized position and reputation. However, in the 
assessment of the overall situation, it was underlined that the dictatorship threat 
had not been “permanently removed” and that the Crown, US and the far right 
(uniforms and civilians alike) could revert to this option if the developments 
started to “endanger the very foundations of the order” or if “reasons of foreign 
policy” lead them to make such a move. Regardless of the final outcome, there 
was little doubt that the Crown would continue to work on the further “frag-
mentation” and “de-layering” of political parties, zeroing in on the left, particular-
ly the Center Union. This was also supported by the unoconcealed ambitions of 
the monarch and his supporters to “expand” their influence “as much as possible” 
and the existence of real conditions for him to become the “absolute overlord” 
of all political developments. The king’s decision of early April 1957 to form a 
government headed by P. Kanellopoulos was also consistent with this scenario.21
The Yugoslav communists saw position of the communists (United 
Democratic Left) in the election year as being not at all easy, noting that they 
were forced to fight alone and registering their “clear line” and “sharp statements”, 
as well as the “current burning topics” that the party leadership commented on 
in public (Cyprus problem, economic hardship, relations with Balkan countries, 
the government’s political course and its tasks…). The diplomats also noted that 
young university students were becoming an increasingly firm pillar of support 
20  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, p. 7.
21 DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 13–14; DA, MSP RS, 
PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 412111, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski on the forma-
tion of the Kanellopoulos government, 4 April 1967.
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to the democratic forces and that the growing success of the struggle for univer-
sity autonomy was a contributing factor to this.22
Yugoslav diplomats believed that the “external factor” was particularly im-
portant for understanding the general situation in Greece. In all developments 
in the country they saw a behind-the-scenes American policy and the imple-
mentation of NATO’s policies. In their opinion, it was realistic to expect that 
the US would try to install political forces that suited their interests. It made 
sense to them that the Americans were interested in stabilizing the situation in 
the southeastern part of NATO and that for this end they were encouraging 
an improvement in Greco-Turkish relations. The fact that the government of 
Stefanos Stefanopoulos had proven unable to deliver a positive resolution of this 
issue was seen as one of the reasons for its downfall. Another reason was the fact 
that Stefanopoulos himself was not a man willing to entirely disregard “legality, 
constitutionality and parliamentarism”. The Yugoslav embassy in Athens had in-
formation that the CIA and the American embassy had different evaluations of 
the situation in Greece, particularly in regard to the need for the Crown to “rely” 
on “moderate-right” or “far-right” political forces. This divergence indirectly sug-
gested the existence of several lines of American presence in Greece. The Yugo-
slav diplomats, however, were unable to tell if the Americans would choose to 
lend their support to some changes and a modernized form of “the bourgeois 
regime in Greece” or back the existing model and the political forces behind it. 23 
As for the United Kingdom, no one doubted that its influence was highly 
important, its methods more subtle and its policy always more effective and very 
relevant. It was speculated that the influence of the United Kingdom was even 
stronger than it seemed and it was believed to have been a long time in the mak-
ing, branched-out and well-positioned both in Greece and in Cyprus. Yugoslav 
diplomats believed that the United Kingdom’s policy and interests were behind 
the moves of the United States.24
Based on analyses of their previous work, the Yugoslav diplomats in Ath-
ens knew they needed to pay more attention to any divergences or conflicts of 
American and British interests, as well as to the political presence of France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany in Greece. Their alert monitoring of Greco-
22  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 9. and 14; DA, MSP 
RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 48293, Telegram from Athens of 4 March 1967.
23  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 11–12; DA, MSP RS, 
PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, cat. no. 44962, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski on talks 
with A. Papandreou dated 4 February 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 
48293, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski from Athens of 4 March 1967; DA, MSP 
RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 411539, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski on talks 
with A. Papandreou dated 29 March 1967.
24  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, p. 16.
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Turkish and Greco-Bulgarian relations was seen as positive. Caution was ad-
vised in assessing the situation in Cyprus and evaluating the importance of this 
question in Greek political life at home. Another task that needed to be given 
more attention was Greece’s Balkan and European policy.25
The Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens took a special interest in the 
situation in the Greek army. Regardless of the economic, ideological and political 
influence they wielded in army ranks, Yugoslav diplomats had information that 
suggested some reservations of a part of the officer corps towards the Americans 
and the American influence on staff decisions in the army. They also believed that 
the Crown had the heaviest influence on army leadership. The group in ques-
tion included a “clique” of around thirty generals and high-ranking officers of a 
far-right persuasion, with another 200 officers under their influence. According 
to the same information, this core of the army leadership could, in certain cir-
cumstances, become the “base” for introducing a dictatorship regime, although 
such an outcome was not seen as likely by Yugoslav diplomats in early January 
1967. According to information seen as realistic, the majority of high-ranking 
officers in the Greek army supported the National Radical Union (ERE); over 
50% of lower ranking officers had democratic inclinations; and many were un-
decided. In addition, estimates suggested that over 60% of active and reserve 
troops held democratic views.26 As for Yugoslavia, it was assessed that the top 
ranks of the Greek army dominantly believed that Yugoslavia pursued “a neutral 
policy and posed no threat to Greece”. Some generals were convinced that if the 
name of SR Macedonia were to be changed, there would be “no problems left to 
resolve”. Nevertheless, Yugoslav diplomats believed that the “Macedonian ques-
tion” could always be used to intensify negative feelings for Yugoslavia.27
As for bilateral relations between the two countries, Yugoslav diplomats 
noted that the Greek side, relying on tradition, persistently tried to maintain 
relations with Yugoslavia “as it once was” and “as they want to see it now”. This 
“inertia” in bilateral relations was to be approached with caution. Hence it was 
of paramount importance for Yugoslav diplomats in Athens to be well aware 
“what is Greece like now and what it [was] becoming”, as well as to familiarize 
Greece with “present-day” Yugoslavia. This approach involved not only collect-
ing information and being in the know, but also making their own assessments 
25  Ibid. pp. 16–17; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 411539, Coded telegram by 
Ambassador Javorski on talks with A. Papandreou dated 29 March 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 
1967, f. 40, doss. 15, cat. no. 411538, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski on talks with 
Kanellopulos dated 30 March 1967.
26  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, p. 12.
27  Ibid. p. 28; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 411597, Coded telegram by Am-
bassador Javorski on changes in the army dated 30 March 1967.
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of the situation in Greece and using them to formulate a more realistic political 
and diplomatic approach.28
The Yugoslav diplomats noted an improvement in the relations between 
Yugoslavia and Greece and were satisfied with mutual contacts that had clarified 
the “existence of minorities and the absence of territorial pretensions”.29 They 
stated that trade had been significantly improved.30 The new trade agreement 
between the two countries was based on the guidelines stipulated in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Industrial cooperation was another 
reason for satisfaction.31 Another element in good bilateral relations was free-
dom of movement. Visas were no longer required for citizens, which could con-
tribute to improving relations in the new year (1967), but this was also met with 
some apprehension among security services.32 There had been some growth in 
the field of cultural cooperation. A very important project was a program of 
cultural cooperation which, among other things, included involving expert insti-
tutions to perform restoration works on the Hilandar Monastery.33
28  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 13–14.
29  In 1966 Greece was visited by B. Pešić, Popov and P. Stambolić, while Plitas, Averoff and 
Kostas returned the favour by visiting Yugoslavia. In addition to economic questions, politi-
cal issues were also discussed (including the Macedonian question). DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, 
f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 17–19; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 6, no. 
410611, Note on the talks of State Secretary M. Nikezić with the former Prime Minister of 
Greece and member of the directorat of ERE, P. Pipinelis, 24 March 1967; DA, MSP RS, 
PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 411539, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski on talks with 
A. Papandreou dated 29 March 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 411538, 
Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski on talks with Kanellopulos dated 30 March 1967; 
DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 413141, Coded telegram by Ambassador Javorski 
on talks with Kanellopulos dated 11 April 1967.
30  Trade between the two countries was worth 24.5 million dinars in 1964; 35 million in 
1965; and 54 million in 1966. In the following period objectives included: removal of the ban 
on importing some Yugoslav products; increasing import contingents; encouraging interest 
in the Yugoslav market; opening business branch offices; participation at fairs; formulating a 
trade and economic policy.
31  Involving the following companies: OHIS Skopje, INA, Industrija motora i traktora, 
Elektrosrbija etc.
32  Greek security services saw Belgrade as a center where Greek nationals came into contact 
with other socialist countries and Greek emigration. In 1966 the embassy in Athens and the 
consulate in Thessaloniki issued 160.222 visas to Greek nationals, while 62.946 Yugoslav 
nationals visited Greece (a 25% increase compared to the year before). 
33  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 7, no. 415070, Report of the Yugoslav delegation 
from the negotiations about the Program of Cultural Cooperation between SFRY and the 
Kingdom of Greece for 1967/68; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceed-
ings, pp. 25–27; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 7, no. 415070, Report of the Yugoslav 
delegation from the negotiations about the Program of Cultural Cooperation between SFRY 
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“The Macedonian question” was one of the problems that constantly 
hampered Greco-Yugoslav relations. There was an evident campaign of denying 
the existence of the Macedonian nation and efforts in the press to exaggerate 
all unresolved issues.34 On the eve of the electoral campaign, limitations to the 
movement of the population and more stringent controls by National Guard 
Defence Battalions and the army were noted in border areas.
Yugoslav diplomats thought that the occasional generating of “tensions” 
was the result of the need of some politically influential forces (army, far right, 
CIA, NATO) to make the public believe that Yugoslav “unclear intentions” and 
pretentions could pose a threat. There was also some apprehension among the 
Western countries, which had more complicated, deeper and more sensitive rela-
tions with Yugoslavia as a non-aligned country than with the members of the ri-
val bloc. Yugoslav diplomats believed that this was being done in order to “block 
the path” of the Yugoslav model of socialism, and that the “national question” 
was being used to protect class- and bloc-related interests. Based on this assess-
ment, the Yugoslav side left the “Macedonian complex” to be resolved at a more 
peaceful time, hoping that the course of events would bring about a change in 
Greek views. This position was enhanced by the fact that the incumbent Greek 
government was only provisional and had limited capacity, inadequate to tackle 
complex problems such as the “Macedonian question”. For these reasons they 
tried to put more emphasis on the questions that the Greek side was more inter-
ested in. At the same time, in an effort to launch a more assertive policy towards 
Greece that would not have to answer to unfounded claims of the far right, there 
were thoughts of issuing a “public statement about the border” and “absence of 
any territorial claims” to counter any doubts about Yugoslavia’s friendly policy. 
There were assessments that this would reduce the “Macedonican question” in 
the eyes of the Greek public to “its real meaning”, improve the position of the 
Macedonian minority, debunk all insinuations of Yugoslavia’s territorial aspira-
tions, defeat all forces that were keeping Greek relations with Yugoslavia un-
der an “embargo” of sorts, placate the fears of a “Yugoslav threat from the north” 
and the Kingdom of Greece for 1967/68. Cultural cooperation was based on a cultural plan 
signed in 1965. Although not included in the plan, there were multiple visits by folk dance 
ensembles (“Ivo Lola Ribar” of Belgrade; “Proleter” of Sarajevo; “Sonja Marinković” of Novi 
Sad, ensembles from Skopje, etc.); musicians (opera singers M. Sabljić, R. Rakočević, Z. 
Krnetić, violinist Marjanović, conductors S. Hubad and V. Čavdarski); painters (M. Protić); 
scholars (G. Ostrogorsky, S. Radonjić, I. Djurić, B. Gavela.).
34  These included the treaty on the waterways of the Vardar which Yugoslavia had not rati-
fied, collecting “material” on enemy activities in SR Macedonica, unresolved issues of minor 
border checkpoints, trade zones in Thessaloniki, the construction of a library, the position of 
the Monastery of Hilandar etc. DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, no. 42890, Proceed-
ings, pp. 25–27; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 48293, Telegram from Athens 
dated 4 March 1967.
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among ruling structures, and create a “constructive climate” conducive to resolv-
ing issues, establishing contacts, and enhancing Yugoslav political, economic and 
cultural influence. 35
***
The coup d’état of 21 April 1967 took everyone by surprise and changed many 
plans. Already the first reports dispatched from Athens to Belgrade stated 
that the coup had caught unprepared the members of the United Democratic 
Left (EDA) who had been arrested in the night of 20/21 April (Iliou,  Kyrkos, 
Glezos). The first targets were party members, MPs, the youth, progressive indi-
viduals, both in Athens and in the interior of the country. The police demolished 
the headquarters of the party and newspaper offices, and confiscated archival 
material. The headquarters of other political parties and newspaper offices 
were sealed. In some diplomatic circles in Athens the arrests of some progres-
sive politicians (Kanellopoulos, Stefanopoulos, Mitsotakis, Papaligouras) were 
interpreted as “camouflage”. However, the majority of diplomats inferred from 
this development that the political parties had not taken part in plotting the 
coup. The arrest of Georgios and Andreas Papandreou was a cause of concern 
for diplomats. The army proceeded to take intimidation measures towards the 
citizens. In the absence of reliable information, rumors were rampant. Informa-
tion was scarce, chaotic and often unreliable, but the number of 11,000 arrests 
was mentioned. The arrests and treatment in prison was believed to be bru-
tal. Foreign correspondents were blocked from “reporting anything” and were 
treated brutally too. According to information that had reached Yugoslav dip-
lomats, during the night some of the prisoners had been taken on special air-
planes to “an unknown location”, presumably the islands. According to the early 
findings of diplomatic sources (the diplomatic missions of France, Turkey, Italy, 
Czechoslovakia, USA, Switzerland, Denmark, Mexico, USSR, with which the 
Yugoslav diplomats cooperated) the coup had been orchestrated by the General 
Staff, and the putschists were led by General Grigorios Spandidakis, Chief of 
the Hellenic Army General Staff. However, it was not entirely clear if General 
Spandidakis fully agreed with the putschists. The coup was done by trigger-
ing a previously-drafted action plan to suppress communists (liquidation of the 
“communist” left) and it was implemented by a group of colonels. Belgrade be-
lieved that the coup in Athens had all the markings of “cold-war politics”. And 
although it was motivated by local, internal reasons, it was believed to dovetail 
with “some external interests”, above all those of the US and NATO. According 
to Belgrade’s information, some units had tried to resist the coup (in the north of 
Greece, Corfu, Crete), but after the king’s intervention they became loyal to the 
35  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 3, cat. no. 42890, Proceedings, pp. 19–23 and 30–32.
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putschist regime. The king himself, according to the available information, had 
been presented with a “fait accompli” and did not oppose them as the putschists 
would not have hesitated to make him abdicate. All sources reported that the 
monarch had not had any previous ties with the organizers of the coup and that 
his support to the putschists, given only after the fact, had been an attempt to 
“avoid bloodshed”. In these circumstances, the West saw the Crown as the “only 
factor of stability” in Greece. The British did not exclude the possibility that 
the putschists enjoyed the support of the Church. The Prime Minister of the 
new regime, Konstantinos Kollias, formerly Attorney General of the Supreme 
Court, was seen as an “obscure figure” with no political experience. Some for-
eign diplomats thought that the coup could not have happened “without the 
consent of some US circles”, while others highlighted that, for all its influence, 
the US embassy had been taken by surprise, and that the coup had not suited 
its plans. The Soviets also admitted that, despite analyses that had indicated the 
possible implementation of extraordinary measures, they had been “completely 
blindsided” by the introduction of military dictatorship. It was believed that the 
Greek army would not make any risky moves in Cyprus. According to early re-
ports, the direct impetus for the coup had been the announced general strike and 
fears that the forthcoming elections would be used as “a referendum against the 
monarchy”. The dominant opinion at the Yugoslav diplomatic mission was that 
the restoration of “normal and elementary human and democratic freedoms” in 
Greece depended on the king and the US.36
From the very first moment the Yugoslav diplomacy did not see the coup 
as an isolated event but rather as part of a long political process that involved a 
succession of civilian conservative parties and forces that had emerged victori-
ous from the civil war replace one another at the helm of Greece. It was in this 
political milieu, in constant showdowns with the democrats and the left, that the 
political and military forces which had executed the coup had emerged. The fact 
that the “progressive forces” (the left) had not been destroyed in the civil war and 
that they had gained prominence in the post-war years had led the radical right 
to seek a solution for the existing crisis in introducing a dictatorship. In this con-
36  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414587, Coded telegram from Athens of 
21 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414590, Coded telegram from 
Athens of 21 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414561, Coded tel-
egram from Athens of 21 April 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414668, Coded 
telegram from Athens of 22 April 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414673, 
Coded telegram from Athens of 22 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 
414781, Coded telegram from Athens of 24 April 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, 
no. 414612, Coded telegram from Athens of 21 April 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 
15, no. 414679, Coded telegram from Athens of 22 April 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, 
doss. 15, no. 414680, Coded telegram from Athens of 22 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 
1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416010, Coded telegram from Athens of 29 April 1967.
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text, it was believed in Belgrade, the military coup was hardly surprising in view 
of the fact that local anti-communism and the “threat” of communist aggression 
on the external level represented the ideological basis of Greek governments, 
preventing any major changes and giving the army a special place in the “de-
fense of order”. The “dictatorship ideology” was particularly widespread among 
some segments of the army, police, bureaucracy and right-wing ideologues. Its 
presence on the political stage, according to Yugoslav diplomats, was advocated 
equally by internal and external actors with a vested interest in keeping the sta-
tus quo and the existing positions and order. The fact that the anti-communist 
action plan also targeted some civic politicians directly led some political groups 
and individuals, otherwise opposed to any democratic solution for the political 
crisis in Greece, to distance themselves from the putschists. Yugoslav diplomats 
concluded that the coup d’état had been easy to carry out, but that its future 
“remains unclear”. The coup brought several unknown outcomes with it: it made 
the “fate of the Crown” uncertain; since the government was not able to protect 
the monarchy, it was unclear if the putschists would delegate power to impor-
tant civilian figures; and it opened the question of the further moves of the po-
litical right, which was inclined to accept the existing situation.37
The Yugoslav diplomats collected their information about the army coup 
– described in Belgrade as “fascist” from the outset – primarily in Athens.38 This 
information was often contradictory in terms content, but in some assessments, 
usually very cautious, the views of the East, West and well-informed Greek 
sources were almost identical. The coup had taken everyone by surprise, regard-
less of signals coming from the army that suggested that the growing “chaos” 
warranted the introduction of a dictatorship. The different sides were also in 
agreement that the coup was the “work of a small circle of colonels” almost un-
known to foreign embassies. It was generally thought that the putschists were 
royalists, but that the monarch had been presented with a “fait accompli” and 
that he did not have he freedom to voice his own will; that he initially resisted, 
but was essentially forced to cooperate. In the opinion of diplomats in Athens, 
no “return to the old [state of things]” could be expected. Another shared posi-
tion was readiness to protest with the putschists against the arrests and the bru-
tal treatment of interned politicians. They were convinced that a protest could 
prevent any executions of communist leaders (Manolis Glezos) and the leaders 
of the civic left (A. Papandreou). Diplomatic representatives in Athens knew 
that the situation was worrying and that it was still to early to fully assess the 
37  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414669, Coded telegram from Athens of 22 
April 1967.
38  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 15, no. 414781, Coded telegram from Athens of 24 
April 1967.
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“seriousness” of it all. Also, all of them were faced with the same question – how 
to establish cooperation with the new regime.39
The views of Belgrade were to a large extent burdened by the non-aligned 
foreign policy concept pursued by Yugoslavia. Based on received information, it 
was thought that the “military-fascist” coup in Greece had all the hallmarks of 
the cold-war policy. It was noted that the coup coincided with the foreign policy 
interests of the US, because the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam and the 
increasingly evident presence of the USSR in the Near East had made Greece 
a sensitive geo-political location that allowed “more direct control of develop-
ments in the Mediterranean” and “exerting pressure on the Middle and Near 
Eastern countries”. Belgrade believed that an electoral victory of the left would 
have made uncertain this strategic-political concept of the US, and Washington 
could not allow it. The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of SFRY believed 
that the coup was a clear message to other dithering NATO members that no 
“breaking of bloc constraints” would be tolerated and no “internal evolution” al-
lowed if it could lead to a change in the foreign policy course and result in a shift 
in the balance of power in Europe. A particular cause for concern was the as-
sumption that the practice of military coups could spill over into the rest of the 
European continent. It was believed that the implementation of such extreme 
solutions did not suit European countries which, in line with their own inter-
ests, sought cooperation and security in Europe as well as increased political 
and military emancipation from the US. The reponse of the USSR was judged 
as “cautious” and “measured” – as tacit acceptance of the fact that Greece was in 
the American sphere of interest. It was noted that the Soviets were happy to 
see American policy being compromised in Europe. The alignment of the US 
with the monarch was seen in Belgrade as a result of concern for the future of 
Greece and an attempt to “channel events” in the direction preferred by the US. 
Belgrade estimated that the military coup in Greece would stall the process of 
cooperation and security in Europe and therefore the development was seen as 
an anti-European move. 40 
Yugoslav diplomats paid particular attention to the putschist regime’s 
face-off with the representatives of democratic and liberal camps, especially the 
39  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415152, Coded telegram from Athens of 25 
April 1967 on Ambassador Javorski’s conversation with US Ambassador Talbot; DA, MSP 
RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415202, Coded telegram from Athens of 25 April 1967 on 
Ambassador Javorski’s conversations with the ambassadors of USSR, Bulgaria and Poland; 
DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415203, Coded telegram from Athens of 25 April 
1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415321, Coded telegram from Athens of 28 
April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415410, Coded telegram from Athens 
of 28 April 1967.
40  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416358, Memo to all diplomatic missions of 
SFRY dated 18 May 1967.
Balcanica L (2019)414
United Democratic Left (EDA). They noted the disbandment of all organiza-
tions where the EDA had wielded influence. Their insights into the regime’s 
propaganda revealed that this party had been labeled as an “instrument of inter-
national communism in Greece”. Pressures on party members and their families, 
efforts to make its members renounce their beliefs and membership in the party, 
ultimatums to officials to publicly declare loyalty to the new regime and become 
“good Greeks”, mass arrests, internments and tortures of party members and 
sympathizers, denying medical assistance to ill EDA representatives in an at-
tempt to remove them by “death from natural causes” – all of this contributed to 
assessments that the putschist regime was reactionary and fascist.41 In this con-
text, a noteworthy detail was the request of representatives of socialist countries 
to the Yugoslavian ambassador Javorski to intercede with the American ambas-
sador, Phillips Talbot, to save the life of M. Glezos.42
The collected reports were contradictory to a large extent, but what they 
all had in common was a concern for the fate of Greece. British analyses indi-
cated that the social upheavals in Greece had “launched” a group of younger and 
radical officers, mostly from underprivileged backgrounds, who were unhappy 
with the “politicians’ uselessness and corruption” and willing to implement a 
“firm-hand policy” in order to secure economic progress. The representatives 
of France and Sweden condemned the new putschist regime for suspending the 
parliamentary system and its oppression of democratic and liberal figures. Paris 
was willing to offer asylum to some Greek politicans. France condemned the 
putschist regime’s dissolution of the parliament and targeting of democratic and 
liberal foces. Paris was concerned that the military coup had instigated wider 
instability that could potentially spill over into neighboring countries. For these 
reasons the French government intended to take a reserved stand towards the 
new regime. Egyptian and Syrian envoys saw the developments in Greece as the 
introduction of “Vietnam methods” in Europe and US attempts to find a “sur-
rogate” for NATO. In their opinion, Greece was to be followed by Italy, where 
the putschist rebellion, with the help of the CIA, could eliminate democratic in-
stitutions. For Cairo, the coup and all of its accompanying developments were an 
attempt to target the United Arab Republic (UAR) and non-aligned countries. 
Damascus was convinced that the Athens coup was just one in a series of similar 
41  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416389, Coded telegram from Athens of 5 May 
1967.
42  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, F. 40, doss. 16, no. 415322, Coded telegram from the Second 
Command of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs to all Yugoslav diplomatic missions 
dated 4 May 1967. The US Ambassador accepted the appeal of Ambassador Javorski about 
the life threat to M. Glezos and pacifying the tensions in Greece. Information received from 
the highest representatives of the putschist government indicated that Glezos would not be 
executed. In a later conversation with members of the US Embassy Javorski learned of Tal-
bot’s intervention to save the life of Andreas Papandreou.
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American and Western actions in Asia, Africa and the Near East. Turkish diplo-
mats implicitly intimated that their country was ready to take military action in 
Cyprus if the putschist regime in Athens decided to make a move in the island. 
In Ankara, developments in Greece were seen as a “Naser-esque” event, with 
Turkey pursuing its own propaganda in this context. The government of Cyprus 
tried to avoid making any public assessments in order to prevent “Greek inter-
nal dilemmas and divisions from spilling over to the island”. In Nicosia, it was 
believed that the Greek position regarding Cyprus would remain unchanged. 
Based on their talks with Makarios III, the Yugoslav diplomats concluded that 
he had been surprised by the coup in Athens and showed some uneasiness in 
regard to the actions of Turkey. Romanians and Hungarians condemned the 
coup and its oppressive measures. Rome believed that the coup was temporary 
and that it would not change the Greek foreign policy.43
In April and May 1967 Yugoslav diplomats actively collaborated with 
other foreign envoys in Athens, supplying the US embassy with information 
about the positions and roles of politicians such as Glezos in the Communist 
Party of Greece. They underlined that the United Democratic Left (EDA), 
which included the Greek communists, had chosen to work towards its political 
objectives “by peaceful means” and that it had advocated preserving constitu-
tionality and parliamentarism. Contacts with American representatives in Ath-
ens allowed Yugoslav diplomats to discern the position of the US towards the 
putschists. Another information of note was that the putschists, lieutenants and 
captains during the war, were staunch anti-communists and unsympathetic to-
wards Yugoslavia, which had supported Markos Vafiadis during the Greek Civil 
War. According to available reports, this group of officers believed that Greece 
was facing a “Slavic threat” and “a danger from the north”, and that in areas along 
the Greco-Yugoslavian border a process of intense Hellenization needed to be 
implemented. Equal attention was paid to the reactions of Soviet and Eastern 
European diplomats. Belgrade was informed of the prognoses of Eastern Euro-
pean embassies that the putschist regime would evolve in time and that power 
would ultimately end up in the hands of the far right. Analyses of the new situ-
ation en-passant included statements of Greek diplomats that the coup was the 
result of the “degeneration and corruption of parliamentarism”; that it was a pro-
43  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416010, Coded telegram from Athens of 29 
April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416473, Coded telegram from Ath-
ens; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, nos. 416612, 415453, 415950, 415475, Coded 
telegrams from Athens; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415371, Coded telegram 
from Nicosia of 26 May 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 416102, Coded 
telegram from Athens of 4 May 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416478, Coded 
telegram from Nicosia of 8 May 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416612, Coded 
telegram from Paris of 8 May 1967.
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cess of the “internal cleansing” of radical elements in the political life of Greece; 
and that the situation would quickly change and normalize.44
There was no doubt about Belgrade’s concern about the developments in 
Greece. The events in Athens were discussed at the session of the Foreign Policy 
Committee of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia held on 27 April 1967. In an 
interview in the Večernje novosti daily the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
underlined that Yugoslavia was closely monitoring the developments in Greece 
and making efforts to develop its relations with its southern neighbor based 
on “equality and non-intervention”, provided that Greece was willing and “stable 
enough” to work on establishing such international relations. The Yugoslav di-
plomacy saw the fascist nature of the putschist regime in its frequent references 
to the “purity of the Greek tribe”, mentioning the threat from an “enemy race” 
(the Slavs) and “Slavo-communism”. Belgrade was afraid of a possible de-sta-
bilization of the general situation in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, the 
strengthening of bloc divisions, and undermining security in Europe. Therefore, 
Yugoslav diplomats in Cairo were asked to, together with their Egyptian col-
leagues, consider all options for influencing a more favorable course of events. 
Diplomatic representatives in Nicosia were instructed to work with Makarios 
III to assess the repercussions that the Athens coup could potentially have in 
Cyprus and in the Mediterranean. Yugoslav envoys in Sofia, Paris, Bucharest, 
Damascus and Ankara were told to make a detailed evaluation of the positions 
of their respective host countries about the situation in Greece. There were con-
stant contacts and exchanges of opinions with the representatives of the Great 
Powers.45
Reports arriving from Soviet circles in Athens indicated that the new re-
gime was replacing incompetent staff in the bureaucracy with even worse alter-
44  DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415410, Coded telegram from Athens of 28 
April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415448, Coded telegram from Athens 
of 27 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415449, Coded telegram from 
Athens of 27 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415450, Coded telegram 
from Athens of 27 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, no. 415471, Coded 
telegram from Athens of 29 April 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 16, nos. 415950 
and 415984, Coded telegrams from Athens of 3 May 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, 
doss. 13, no. 438038, Coded telegram from Athens of 26 August 1967; DA, MSP RS, PA, 
1967, f. 40, doss. 10, no. 435921, Coded telegram from Athens of 14 October 1967; DA, MSP 
RS, PA, 1967, f. 40, doss. 4, no. 436962, , Coded telegram from Athens of 26 October 1967.
45  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 414456, Coded telegram from Belgrade to diplo-
matic missions of SFRY of 28 April 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 414456, Note 
on the measures undertaken by the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs concerning the coup 
in Greece dated 3 May 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416992, Coded telegram 
from Athens of 8 May 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 417851, Coded telegram 
from Athens of 17 May 1967.
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natives. It was noted that the putschists had no economic program and that ef-
forts to “quickly conjure one up” were proving futile. The economic situation was 
seen as very difficult. The absence of loans, according to the reports of Yugoslav 
diplomats, “had frozen” all relevant economic activities. The collected informa-
tion suggested that there were growing feelings of “internal dissent”, “ambition”, 
“envy” and “uncertainty and nerves” among the putschists. The base used to ex-
ecute the coup and establish the new regime was seen as “too narrow”. The newly 
established regime, according to reports, was struggling with a lack of staff op-
tions. Dissatisfaction was also registered in the army. According to Soviet analy-
ses, there were two options: the regime could quickly resort to “large-scale mea-
sures of terror and physical elimination of prisoners and all that is progressive 
and stands in their way”, or there would be a “positive turnaround and shift in the 
putschists’ internal and foreign policy”. The Soviet diplomats believed that the 
“putschist coterie” would never willingly renounce power.46
In Belgrade there were fears that the countries of the Eastern “contingent” 
were trying to “push [Yugoslavia] to be at the frontline” of criticism of the Greek 
situation and thereby isolate it from the West. For this reason the diplomatic 
representatives of Yugoslavia shied away from any form of “joint action” with 
the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist bloc. Reacting to the views 
of Eastern European diplomats that reports of the conflicting interests of the 
US and the putschists were to be regarded with utmost suspicion, that the de-
velopments in Greece were to be assessed in the wider context of the Vietnam 
War and the intensifying conflict in the Near East, and that the efforts of the 
new regime to present itself as affably as possible were to be received with cau-
tion, Yugoslav diplomats – even when they agreed with these views – expressed 
evident reservations. Like their Eastern European colleagues, they also saw the 
putschist regime in Greece as fascist (“revival of fascism”). They were convinced 
that the dictatorship in Greece was “encouraging” the emergence of a “fascist 
climate” in other European countries (Italy, West Germany) and saw the new 
Greek regime as a threat to European security. They read the response of other 
European countries as their being aware that the events in Greece were “a dan-
gerous phenomenon” that needed to be opposed.47
Western diplomats expressed concern for the future of Greece. The 
French and the British openly strove to safeguard the monarchy and the Crown. 
The British believed that the current situation defied the monarch’s abilities and 
experience. They saw the putschist regime as a dictatorship of the police rather 
46  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416992, Coded telegram from Athens of 8 May 
1967.
47  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 418498, Coded telegram from Athens of 19 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 418498/ 2 ́, Coded telegram from Belgrade to 
the embassy in Athens dated 26 May.
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than the army, and considered it strongly anti-communist in nature. They feared 
a “sudden explosion of the people’s dissatisfaction”, but did not believe that the 
putschists would resort to “killing prisoners or any wider measures of open ter-
ror”. The British underlined that there had been no imminent reason for the 
coup. According to London’s information, the putschist regime first attracted 
supporters in circles that believed that the coup had “put an end to a period of 
fruitless political friction that contributed little to the country’s progress”. As for 
relations with Yugoslavia, London underlined that the putschists had “warped 
views” and that “they had slept through twenty years of Yugoslav internal devel-
opment”. Belgrade was advised to accept contacts with Athens and contribute to 
the “evolution” of the existing regime. At the same time the British influenced the 
members of the putschist regime to stop proliferating tensions with Yugoslavia 
and bring their relations with the northern neighbor within “a framework of 
normalcy”.
Envoys of the non-aligned countries were convinced that the US had ac-
tively taken part in the coup (via proxy) and that the monarch had also been 
involved in the recent events. The coup was seen as “well-executed”. The objective 
and nature of the coup was judged as fascist and anti-communist. It was believed 
that the putschists had been raised to believe in a “junta” ideology, whose pillars 
were the Crown, circles in the army and police, and the far-right.  The diplomats 
of non-aligned countries did not expect that the putschists would stand down 
or that there would be a swift turnaround in Greece. The envoys of Egypt were 
particularly interested in the policy of the West in the Near East. In their opin-
ion, the toppling of the dynasty – which the putschists had not done – would 
have given the developments in Greece a “more positive direction”. From this 
persepctive, Cairo believed that the putschists had “squandered their opportu-
nity” and that this had brought them even closer to radical anti-communism and 
persecuting the left.48
Yugoslav diplomats in Athens were actively working on alarming the 
global public about the issue of political prisoners that the putschist regime held 
interned in camps, usually in the islands. They actively advocated saving Iliou, 
the leader of EDA’s caucus in the parliament, who was critically ill. They were 
among the most agile diplomats in pressuring the regime to release some aged, 
exhausted or ailing political opponents. The Yugoslav diplomats publicized the 
information they received from the prisoners’ families, reporting indescribable 
tortures suffered by communists and members of the United Democratic Left 
(EDA). The action to get them released “involved” many organizations such as 
the Jurist Association, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Socialist Alliance and the 
48  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 417115, Coded telegram from Athens of 13 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 418838, Coded telegram from Athens of 24 May 
1967.
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Red Cross. Frequent contacts were made with the diplomatic missions of the 
USSR and other socialist counties, Mexico, UAR, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, US, France, Denmark, etc. The putschist regime was asked to allow 
diplomatic envoys and reporters to visit the camps and prisons where the re-
gime’s opponents were being kept.49
Immigration from Greece and the regime’s terror against the Macedonian 
minority in the northern parts of the country were monitored with no less at-
tention. The figure of 8,247 immigrants in the first six months of 1967 (4,250 
from northern Greece) was several times smaller than in previous years (in 1966 
29,500 had left Greece, with 9,300 of those leaving northern Greece), but this 
was the result of implemented political measures that decided who would be 
allowed to leave and who would not. At the same time it was noted that the 
regime and the Greek Orthodox Church were campaigning to ban the Macedo-
nian minority from using their own language. Many arrests of people who had 
been cought speaking Macedonian in public were registered. The leading role in 
the reforming of the local population was entrusted to the clergy. An additional 
contingent of 120 Greek priests was dispatched to Macedonian-populated ar-
eas with the task of doing their duty for “faith and country”. Another means of 
intense pressure were school managements, which changed the teaching staff in 
schools, appointing younger and more agile teachers tasked with “spiritually re-
forming rural children in Macedonian villages”. Children were banned from us-
ing the Macedonian language and penalized if they did so. The process of Helle-
nization was also implemented among immigrants of Macedonian nationality.50
Analyses of the statements issued by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs were read by Yugoslav diplomats as the regime’s efforts to justify its exis-
tence by citing a threat of “communist regimes”. Shifting responsibility to other 
neighboring countries had its “utilitarian value” in a cold-war world and was 
meant to, ideologically and politically, secure the understanding of the US and 
West Europe for the dictatorship in Athens. The fact that Belgrade and other 
capitals of socialist counties had condemned the putschist regime was seen in 
Athens as a sign of “anxiety” that their political “friends” (Communist Party of 
49  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 416927, Coded telegram from Athens of 10 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 1, no. 417158, Coded telegram from Athens of 13 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 417707, Coded telegram from Athens of 17 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 417851, Coded telegram from Athens of 17 May 
1967. The Red Cross mission that visited the camp on the island of Gyaros included an 
ICRC delegate who had given a positive report on the situation in Auschwitz and other Nazi 
camps during the Second World War. 
50  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 7, no. 428978, Coded telegram from Athens of 4 August 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 7, no. 428979, Coded telegram from Athens of 4 August 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 7, no. 442712, Report of the Consul General in Thes-
saloniki dated 8 November 1967.
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Greece, Center Union, United Democratic Left) had been eliminated from po-
litical life. In this way the putschist regime tried to paint itself as the victim and 
the West’s most consistent ally in the struggle against communism and to make 
its neighbors (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria…) appear as a “threat” to Greece. Official 
Belgrade had information that the puschists, especially one of the regime’s chief 
ideologues Colonel Papadopoulos, underlined that “Yugoslavia was more of a 
threat to the new regime that the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw 
Pact”. In line with this notion, military exercises of various purposes were be-
ing done on the Yugoslav border. The treaty of border exhange was suspended; 
Yugoslav nationals were exiled or arrested; Yugoslav nationals had difficulties 
in obtaining Greek visas; anti-Yugoslav propaganda was intensified; the exis-
tence of the Macedonian nation was denied… Protests coming from Belgrade 
and other socialist counties against the suspension of parliamentary institutions 
were seen by the putschist regime as meddling in the internal affairs of Greece 
and the “threat of pan-Slavism”. Yugoslavia was accused of aspirations to reach 
Thessaloniki and was described as the “main enemy of the current regime” in 
Athens. All of this contributed to the “slowing down” and “narrowing” of existing 
cooperation between Yugoslavia and Greece. However, regardless of the Greek 
regime’s negative assessments, in mid-1967 the Yugoslav diplomacy proceeded to 
establish “limited contacts”.51
Reports from Athens indicated that the putschist regime was systemati-
cally and rapidly working on establishing its control over state institutions. This 
was particularly true of staff decisions in the army, police, means of propaganda, 
and key ministries. Yugoslav diplomats saw the regime’s fascist nature in its dis-
bandment of democratic and progressive associations, dissolution of over 160 
central and regional associations of workers and public servants, confiscating 
their property and blocking their funds in banks, arresting many officials, ban-
ning strike rights, and oppression of national minorities. The absence of any 
significant changes in the Bank of Greece and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was seen as the regime’s intention to avoid additional doubts of the country’s 
economic and foreign-policy course. The formation of a “well-organized and dis-
ciplined” regime party and a “liberal party” that would pretend to be its opposi-
tion was also meant to contribute to the stabilization of the existing situation. 
51  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 42, doss. 2, no. 418586, Coded telegram from Athens of 22 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 42, doss. 2,no. 420432, Note on the conversation of Deputy 
State Secretary D. Belovski with the Greek Ambassador in Belgrade, N. Kamboularis, of 
16 June 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 42, doss. 3, no. 427297, Coded telegram to all Yugoslav 
diplomatic missions of 16 August 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 42, doss. 2, no. 422354, Greco-
Yugoslav relations after the coup in Greece of 1 July 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 13, 
no. 438902, Interior political situation in Greece and Greco-Yugoslav relations after the coup 
of 21 April, 11 November; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 13, no. 442798, Some questions 
concerning bilateral relations of Greece and SFRY, 18 December 1967.
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There were indications that, with the passage of time, disagreements between 
the monarch and the putschists were beginning to “surface”, as well as reports 
that the king enjoyed the support of former politicians. It was assessed that the 
putschists were trying to “re-root” the entire political life in Greece and portray 
it as “national democracy”. After the liquidation of the left, the main threat to 
the regime came from the far right. The idea was to weaken its position by im-
plementing personnel changes in state institutions, preventing old political par-
ties and their leaders from getting involved in the country’s political life, strong 
anti-communism, destroying and demoralizing. This regime policy, according 
to Yugoslav diplomats, coincided with the “general interests” of the US and the 
West. The social base of the regime was made up of “middle and petty classes”, 
as well as the rural population which believed that the putschists would improve 
its social standing and thereby “rectify the injustices” of the previous regimes. 
Collected information also indicated that large capitalists (shipping magnates, 
industrialists…) had still not joined the new regime and were hesitant about 
returning their evacuated funds to the country. Information coming from the 
regime’s opponents, foreign diplomats and well-informed journalists suggested 
that the political situation in Greece was “thickening” and that the responsible 
political actors were striving to engineer a “peaceful evolution” of political life.52
In the last months of 1967 Yugoslav diplomats in Athens thought that 
the key actors in Greece (the Crown, the far right, the Americans etc.) were 
primarily concerned about the extraordinary measures that had resulted from 
the coup being overcome peacefully (“evolution of political life”). They noted a 
fear of internal conflicts, growing dissatisfaction and hiccups in the country’s 
economy. It was concluded that the putschists were working in favor of future 
right-wing rule, both domestic and foreign, and implementing a “useful cleans-
ing” of democratic forces, which was the reason that they were still being of-
fered compromises. Like the members of the Center Union (Mavros), they did 
not believe the promises of political changes. According to Yugoslav diplomats, 
the final outcome was expected to be a “form of parliamentarism” that would 
incorporate the putschist government. In this way, with the help of right-wing 
circles in the US and the West, the initiated process of reforming the “revolution” 
of the coup would be completed. This process would secure the legacies of the 
52  MSP RS, PA, 1967, doss. 2, f. 41, no. 418678, Coded telegram from Athens of 20 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 418795, Coded telegram from Athens of 8 May 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 2, no. 420689, Coded telegram from Athens of 5 June 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 3, no. 421819, Coded telegram from Athens of 15 June 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 3, no. 423212, Coded telegram from Athens of 23 June 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 3, no. 423480, Coded telegram from Athens of 27 June 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 3, no. 424510, Coded telegram from Athens of 5 July 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 42, doss. 3, no. 427297, Coded telegram from Belgrade to all 
diplomatic missions abroad, dated 16 August 1967.
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coup and establish a sort of “quasi-parliamentarism”, which would at the same 
time pacify the democratic public opinion in the West. The regime’s tendency to 
implement “radical measures” had disillusioned the analysts of political develop-
ments in Greece that the political opposition (both right-wing and left-wing) 
could affect the course of events in a more meaningful way.53
Under the military junta, the Communist Party of Greece and the United 
Democratic Left (EDA) suffered huge losses. Party members who had managed 
to escape arrest were hiding in very difficult circumstances. Former sympathiz-
ers, intimidated by the regime’s threats that anyone who assisted communists in 
hiding would be tried at a military court, refused to offer them refuge. The po-
lice, although initially reserved toward the putschists, had completely identified 
with the regime after some personnel changes. Artists were being blacklisted, 
which meant that their work could not be shown or played (composer Mikis 
Theodorakis, director and art director of the National Theater Alexis Minotis, 
ethno-musicologist Dora Stratou, prominent actresses Melina Mercouri and 
Irene Pappas). The anti-communist campaign reached its peak in December 
1967, at the time of open dissatisfaction with the situation in the country, the 
monarchists” military involvement and the capitulation in Cyprus. In contrast 
to the general public in the West, which silently watched the wanted-fugitive 
lists, enormous prizes offered to anyone who would help the regime apprehend 
communist “assassins” and “criminals”, military courts, the emergence of kanga-
roo courts, dissemination of false propaganda about a “communist conspiracy”, 
and the climate of terror, the Yugoslav diplomacy actively worked to assist the 
“progressive forces” in Greece.54 
In early December 1967 there were reports from Athens that Kon-
stantinos Karamanlis had decided to become politically active and asked the 
putschists to stand down. Since his supporters made up a significant chunk of 
53  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 4, no. 434660, Coded telegram from Athens of 6 October 
1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 4, no. 439432, Coded telegram from Athens of 17 No-
vember 1967.
54  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 3, no. 424669, Coded telegram from Athens of 6 July 1967; 
MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 3, no. 424982, Coded telegram from Athens of 6 July 1967; 
MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 442444, Coded telegram from Athens of 13 December 
1967. Due to the oppression it suffered, at the 12th Party Plenum of 1968 the Communist 
Party of Greece split into two factions. From this moment on, according to Yugoslav diplo-
mats who carefully followed the events within the Greek Communist Party, the conflicting 
party camps, their ideological orientations, possibilities of future cooperation, fundamental 
views on the internal development of the country, foreign policy and membership were “ir-
reconcilably at odds”. Aware of the harmfulness of their conflict, the two leaderships were 
ready to accept responsibility for the new situation. The Yugoslav diplomats reported that 
this was a “deep rift” rooted in different starting points and divergent views on key ideological 
questions and internal and foreign policy.
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the regime’s “political base”, this move was seen as a “diversion within their own 
ranks”. For these reasons some high-ranking putschists in power demanded that 
Karamanlis be brought to a military court and tried for high treason. In this 
new situation the Yugoslav diplomats in Athens predicted a rapid differentiation 
within the National Radical Union (ERE). Their information suggested that the 
leadership of the Center Union (Mavros, G. Papandreou), previously inclined to 
pursue a tactic of waiting and speculating, had positively received Karamanlis’s 
move. At the same time it was concluded that Karamanlis’s statement did not 
indicate any changes in his position towards the left camp and that he still saw 
them as “responsible for the political chaos that had faciliated the military coup”. 
For watchful analysts, the political “activation” of K. Karamanlis was a sign that 
something big was about to happen. Some of the information that had reached 
Yugoslav diplomats suggested that the monarch could take responsibility for the 
situation in the country.55
December 1967 was no less turbulent in Greece than the whole year. In 
the first days of December, King Constantine II, with the help of the military 
(Third Army and parts of the Navy and Air Force), tried to make the colonels 
who had organized the coup to surrender power to civilians. Since he relied 
on units full of infiltrated junta members, as it turned out, his move could not 
meaningfully threaten the Regime of the Colonels. Any hopes that constitution-
ality and parliamentarism would be “restored” fell through and the monarch left 
the country. Unlike the king, who did not want to see bloodshed and offered am-
nesty to all participants in the coup of 21 April 1967, some putschists were ready 
to take to arms against those who “in pursuit of fame had persuaded the king 
to go against the national government and nation”. The regime’s intense propa-
ganda insisted on the view that the monarch had been “seduced” by the “enemies 
of the revolution”. Tanks and mechanized infantry were sent out to the streets 
of Athens. Yugoslav diplomats reported that the army had taken all key public 
buildings and institutions. Movements of troops were registered in the north 
of the country. This behavior of the putschists suggested that there would be 
no compromise and that conflict was “unavoidable”. The monarch’s failed initia-
tive was seen by diplomats as “immature” and the new situation as “qualitatively 
novel”. The position of the king, who after his attempt to overthrow the putsch-
ist regime had gone to Italy, was seen as very difficult and even more reliant on 
the West. The Yugoslav diplomats closely followed the response of London and 
Washington to the new events and expected the king and the regime to reach a 
compromise as a result of their interventions and pressures. The failure of the 
monarch’s counter-coup led the key Western powers to reevaluate the role of 
the Greek monarchy in the country’s power structure and the king’s capacity to 
55  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 4, no. 441558, Coded telegram from Athens of 4 Decem-
ber 1967.
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play a vital role in the “process of restoring constitutional order”. In the opinion 
of Yugoslav diplomats, this was a way for Western countries, primarily the US, 
to recognize the putschist regime and replace “technical contacts” with full dip-
lomatic relations, while citing an agreement with them and the king (a “façade 
monarchy” of sorts). In this possible scenario, the role of the monarch would be 
completely marginalized and merely formal, but the political right-wing camp 
would be left “some space” to work with after the transition to “constitutional 
order” promised by the regime. This outcome, which would result in a blend 
of “putschist dictatorship” and “court conservatism”, would improve the regime’s 
international position, bolster internal unity (within the junta) and consolidate 
its position in the army. The only option unacceptable to the US and the West 
in Greece was allowing the “moderate left” to come to power and inaugurate a 
process of “turning left”. Yugoslav diplomats noted a “complete indifference of the 
people” to the political events in the country and based on this concluded that 
neither the putschist regime nor the monarch and civic politicians had a strong 
reputation or influence in the country. According to their estimates, the new 
Papadopoulos regime, with which the Western counties hesitated to establish 
immediate contacts, could potentially build its popularity in the future on a ref-
erendum about declaring Greece a republic. The call of the Communist Party 
of Greece to the people to mount a rebellion was seen as a risky escapade. Like 
representatives of other embassies in Athens (US, USSR, United Kingdom), 
the Yugoslav diplomats also thought that Greece – with or without the king – 
had “entered a period of permanent instability, with a high probability of more 
internal upheavals and different possible epilogues”.56
***
Intensive conversations with members of political parties, closely reading the 
press, talks with other foreign diplomats, analytical evaluations of many indi-
vidual events and their contextualization in the wider picture of the situation 
in Greece allowed Yugoslav diplomats to accurately assess the situation in the 
country, identify the potential of the military junta and the centers of putschist 
56  MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 442332, Coded telegram from Athens of 13 Decem-
ber 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 442538, Coded telegram from Athens of 15 
December 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 442611, Coded telegram from Athens 
of 16 December 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 443215, Coded telegram from 
Athens of 15 December 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 443561, Coded telegram 
from Athens of 21 December 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 443670, Coded 
telegram from Athens of 23 December 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 5, no. 443780, 
Coded telegram from Athens of 26 December 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 6, no. 
443902, Coded telegram from Athens of 28 December 1967; MSP RS, PA, 1967, f. 41, doss. 
6, no. 444334, Coded telegram from Athens of 28 December 1967.
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support in Greece and abroad, follow their showdown with left-wing and demo-
cratic options, recognize the ambitions of the putschist regime and the nature 
of their dictatorship, have insight into the situation of the opposition, make out 
the contours of a possible state-political system, monitor relations with neigh-
boring countries, closely follow the regime’s position on the Macedonian minor-
ity, follow the moves of the monarch, assess the permanence of compromises, 
observe the pressure of the international public and the controversial behavior 
of the Great Powers, and offer prognoses of the course of events in the near 
future.57 Yugoslav diplomats collected some of the relevant information on the 
situation in Greece in other capitals (London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris…). This 
information contributed to a wider evaluation of the existing circumstances and 
a sharper picture of the developments in Greece. The general opinion was that 
the Yugoslav diplomats were much better informed and more agile than their 
counterparts from other Eastern European counties, who were seen as “slow”, 
“unsure”, “confused”, “contradictory” and so on. In the days and months follow-
ing the coup, the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens was a center where 
many came to get information, consult with their peers, verify their assessments 
and learn Belgrade’s views. Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, collected 
information was sent to Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Koča Popović, Mijalko 
Todorović, Marko Nikezić, Ivan Gošnjak, Petar Stambolić and Ivan Mišković.
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